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Corporate Governance Indices and Construct Validity 
© 2016 Bernard S. Black. All rights reserved. 
Abstract 
Manuscript Type:  Conceptual and empirical. 
Research Question/Issue:  Many studies of firm-level corporate governance rely on aggregate 
“indices” to measure underlying, unobserved governance.  But we are not confident that we know 
how to build these indices.  Often we are unsure both as to what is “good” governance, and how one 
can proxy for this vague concept using observable measures.  We conduct an exploratory analysis of 
how researchers can address the “construct validity” of firm-level governance indices, which poses a 
major challenge to all such studies.   
Research Findings/Insights:  We assess the construct validity of governance indices for four major 
emerging markets (Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey), developed in prior work.  In that work, we build 
country-specific indices, using country-specific governance elements that reflect local norms, 
institutions, and data availability, and show that these indices predict firm market value in each 
country.  The use of country-specific indices puts great stress on the construct validity challenge of 
assessing how well a governance measure matches the underlying concept.  We address here how 
well these four country-specific indices, and subindices for aspects of governance such as board 
structure or disclosure, measure unobserved, underlying actual governance quality. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications:  The construct validity of corporate governance indices should 
be addressed in research using these indices.  We provide guidance on how researchers can do so. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications:  The uncertain construct validity of most corporate governance 
indices suggests caution in relying on research using these indices as a basis for firm-level governance 
changes, or country-level legal reforms. 
Keywords: Corporate governance indices, construct validity, Brazil, Korea, India, Russia, Turkey, 
boards of directors, disclosure, shareholder rights, ownership structure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A common strategy in research on firm-level corporate governance is to build 
corporate governance indices and then see whether they predict firm value or performance.  
These indices are imperfect, but their use is widespread because researchers lack good 
alternatives (Bhagat, Bolton and Romano, 2008).  One concern with governance indices is 
what they actually measure.  The concept of firm-level governance is abstract and latent 
rather than concrete and observable, and researchers are forced to proxy for this vague 
concept using observable measures. This raises concerns about the degree to which the proxy 
(a governance index) relates to the underlying concept it claims to measure (governance).  
The fit between the observable proxy or “construct” and the underlying concept  is known as 
construct validity.1  This core issue is rarely addressed in corporate governance research.  
Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) and Dey (2008) are exceptions.2 
We discuss here what can usefully be said about which of the many possible 
governance indices are sensible constructs, which are likely to do a reasonable job of 
measuring of what they intend to measure? We conduct here an exploratory analysis of how 
to tackle this question, using tools drawn from the causal inference, education and 
psychology literatures. 
The often-used Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) “G” index illustrates the central 
role that governance indices play in corporate governance research and why it is important to 
address issues of construct validity in index construction. They create a governance index 
with 24 equally weighted elements that measure takeover defenses and provide evidence that 
this construct predicts firm value and performance.  Some of these elements are directly 
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chosen by firms; others by the states where they incorporate.  Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009) criticize this index and argue that only six firm-chosen elements, which they use to 
build their own “E” index, predict firm value and performance; the remainder are noise.  
Straska and Waller (2014) beg to differ, and report evidence that the 18 measures that 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell want to drop from the G index, treated as an “O” (for other) 
index, predict takeover likelihood.  Karpoff, Schonlau and Wehrly (2016) build yet a 
different subset of the G-index elements, which they call the “D” index, that also predicts 
takeover likelihood.  The confusion would be compounded if one considered takeover 
defense elements not in the original G index, or sought to build a broader governance index 
not limited to takeover defenses.  
As the basis for our own analysis, we begin with our own prior work (Black et al. 
2014 and 2016), in which we build governance indices in four major emerging markets 
(Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey).  In those studies, we argue that using a “common index” 
that relies on the same set of governance “elements” in each country – as massively 
multicountry studies typically do3 – is likely to yield poor constructs.  As an example, 
consider board independence, often seen as a central component of corporate governance.  
Typical levels of board independence vary greatly across countries.  Many Brazilian and 
Turkish firms have no independent directors at all.  Korean firms are required to have a 
minimum of 25% independent directors, and Indian firms must have either a majority of 
independent directors or else at least one-third independent directors plus a non-executive 
board chair.  Thus, a board structure element that asks whether a firm has one independent 
director is useful in Brazil and Turkey, but meaningless in India and Korea.  Conversely, an 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
 4 
element that asks whether a firm has a majority of independent directors is useful in India and 
Korea, but of limited value in Brazil and Turkey, where very few firms have a majority of 
independent directors.  To use the fraction of independent directors as a governance element 
would also be misleading: the effect in Brazil and Turkey of firms moving from zero to one 
independent director may be very different from the effect of increasing the number of 
independent directors in India or Korea, where a minimum percentage is required by law.   
As another example, consider audit committees.  These committees might be 
important, but we cannot measure their value in countries such as India and Turkey, where all 
public firms must have an audit committee.  In Brazil, many firms rely on a substitute local 
institution, the fiscal board, which is appointed by the shareholder’s meeting rather than the 
board of directors.  Only a minority of firms has an audit committee, and most of the firms 
with an audit committee have a fiscal board as well.  The marginal contribution the audit 
committee makes to “governance” will thus be very different, and more nuanced, in Brazil 
than in other countries. 
We pursue a different approach here and in our prior work.  We recognize that the 
meaning of the same element will often differ across countries.  We build different constructs 
in each country, that are likely to proxy for similar underlying governance aspects.  More 
specifically, we first identify a limited number of general aspects of governance, using a 
combination of our own judgment, the available empirical evidence and such corporate 
governance theory as exists:  board structure, disclosure, shareholders rights, related party 
transactions and ownership structure.  Next, for each country, we identify elements 
(observable variables) that are “meaningfully” related to each of the general aspects. We treat 
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an element j as meaningful in country i if: (i) element j is often believed to correspond to 
good governance (sometimes with empirical support, but often not, given the current state of 
the governance literature); (ii) we judge, based on our own knowledge, that it is likely to be 
relevant to governance in country j; (iii) we have reasonably complete data on element i 
across the firms in our country j sample; (iv) there is reasonable variation in element i across 
firms in country j; and (v) element i is not too similar to another element that is also used in 
country j. Thus, the elements used in each country reflect a combination of local norms, local 
institutions and local data availability.  We use these elements to build proxies for the general 
aspects of governance.  We call these proxies “subindices.”  We then build each overall 
country governance index (CGI) as an equally weighted average of the subindices.  
Manifestly, many other approaches to building indices are possible. 
How well does a particular construct (a board structure subindex in a particular 
country, say) represent the corresponding general aspect of governance (board structure)?  
We cannot assess the validity of board structure subindex, seen as a construct, simply by 
asking whether this subindex empirically predicts an outcome of interest (we focus here on 
Tobin’s q).  If board structure subindex predicts the outcome, it could still be a poor 
construct, which is measuring something else—perhaps about “governance,” perhaps not – or 
is simply correlated with an omitted variable which is the “true” predictor of the outcome.  
Board structure index could also be a useful construct, yet fail to predict the outcome because 
the underlying theory that posits a relationship between the general aspect (board structure) 
and the outcome is wrong. Therefore, predictive power is neither necessary nor sufficient, as 
a test for construct validity. 
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We pursue here two approaches for assessing construct validity.  First, we measure 
Cronbach’s α scores, both for subindices (comprised of elements) and overall indices 4 
(comprised of subindices).  Cronbach’s α measures the inter-item correlation among the 
elements of an index.  If the elements of a subindex collectively contribute to measuring the 
same general aspect of governance, one would expect those elements to be positively 
correlated and to yield a reasonably high Cronbach’s α.  At the same time, overly high inter-
element correlations suggest that two elements are not sufficiently distinct and are capturing 
the same concept. Furthermore, if subindices in fact capture distinct aspects of governance, 
Cronbach’s α across subindices cannot be extremely high.  
Our second approach uses principal component analysis5 (PCA) as an alternative 
procedure to compute subindices.  PCA consists of finding clusters (principal components) of 
related elements. Each component consists of a group of elements that correlate more among 
themselves than with other elements not belonging to that component. In this fashion, 
elements are aggregated according to their statistical properties rather than by prior leads 
from theory or previous empirical evidence. If our subindices (based on prior knowledge) are 
good constructs, one would expect that components will be loaded mostly or entirely of 
elements from a single subindex. We also perform regression analysis to test the predictive 
power of subindices vis-à-vis components. 
We find in all four countries that overall indices that are calculated as the average of 
subindices present reasonable construct validity.  Subindices in general have positive but 
moderate mean inter-subindex correlations suggesting that they capture different aspects of 
governance.  At the same time, these correlations imply that any estimate of the effect of firm 
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value or performance of a narrowly defined index, a single subindex, and even more so a 
single element such as board independence, is likely subject to omitted variable bias, due to 
omitting important aspects of governance.  At the subindex level, we find that construct 
validity is reasonable in most cases, but is suspect for some subindices in some countries. 
We focus here on the validity of firm-level corporate governance indices.  We do not 
engage with the separate literature on country-level governance.  However, efforts to build 
indices which measure country-level governance are likely to face similar issues.  Consider, 
for example, an effort to measure creditor rights or shareholder rights (e.g., La Porta et al. 
(1998).  The same formal legal rule could have very different effects.  For example, the effect 
of formal shareholder rights could depend on the availability of derivative suits, or contingent 
fees for lawyers (Cheffins et al., 2008).  
This paper is structured as follows: The next sections, in turn: (i) describe the data, 
samples and the variables; (ii) detail the two approaches, Cronbach’s α and Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), that we use to assess the construct validity of country indices; 
(iii) present and discuss our results: and (iv) provide a conclusion. 
SAMPLES, GOVERNANCE SURVEYS, AND INDICES 
Sample Construction 
To build country governance indices, we rely on nonpublic data from firm surveys 
that were conducted in Brazil (2004, 2006, and 2009), India (2006, 2007, and 2012) and 
Korea (1998-2004), and public data hand-collected from firm annual reports in Turkey 
(2006-2012). This data collection effort greatly improves data quality compared to public 
data or commercial surveys, but also limits sample size and available years.  We exclude 
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state-controlled firms, subsidiaries of foreign companies and banks.  Table 1 provides 
summary statistics for Brazil; the Appendix provides similar information for India, Korea, 
and Turkey.6 
[Table 1 about here] 
Construction of Governance Indices 
Table 2 provides details on which potential Board Structure Subindex elements are 
available in each country.  The Appendix provides an expanded table covering our full 
governance indices.  The comparison of elements across countries illustrates why an index 
constructed using the same elements in each country is not meaningful, and why we instead 
build indices that rely on different elements in different countries.  For instance, consider a 
minimum requirement for a “common” index of having only elements which are measurable 
in all four countries and, in our judgment, useful elements of a governance index in at least 
two of them.  Such an index would have only 15 elements: 5 for board structure, 4 for 
disclosure, 2 each for board procedure and ownership; and one each for shareholder rights 
and RPTs. Of the 15 elements, 12 are useful in three countries, but none are useful in all four.  
Furthermore, as Black et al. (2014) show, this common index has no power to predict firm 
market value. 
Most elements are dichotomous (coded as "1" if a firm has the attribute and "0" 
otherwise).7  We normalize continuous variables to run from 0 to 1.  Table 2 also indicates 
which elements are non-public (available only from our surveys).  For each element, it 
indicates in which countries the element is used and in which country it is either not available 
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due to lack of data or not useful (forbidden, mandatory, too common, too rare or too similar 
to another element). 
[Table 2 about here] 
Within each subindex, we weight each element equally.  Equal weighting of elements 
is a common practice when researchers build indices; doing so reflects our lack of knowledge 
about which elements are important (or more important); using equal weights also limits the 
temptation to engage in data mining when assigning weights.  We then scale each subindex to 
run from 0 to 100 and take their average to compute the CGI.  Table 3, Panel A, provides 
summary statistics for Brazil; the Appendix includes similar information for other countries.  
When running regressions one wants coefficients to be comparable across countries. Only for 
this purpose, we normalize each subindex to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Then, we sum 
the normalized subindices to create an overall country index. Finally, we normalize the 
country index to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Data on particular elements is sometimes incomplete, so we need a procedure for 
dealing with missing values.  Consider, for instance, a case in which there is one element 
missing out of four (e.g., Shareholder Rights in India).  It does not seem reasonable to throw 
out the information provided by the three remaining elements.  We use the following 
procedure: if data for a given element is missing just for a small number of firms, we 
compute the corresponding subindex as the average of the non-missing elements. Using this 
procedure, the sample does not increase at all in India; very little in Brazil (10 observations 
out of 158; 6%), moderately in Turkey: from 998 to 1,199; 20%); and substantially in Korea: 
(from 2,149 to 3,098; 44%).  The numbers for Korea and Turkey show the importance of 
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dealing with missing elements, rather than dropping these observations.  In subindices with 
high mean inter-item correlations, our procedure is likely to introduce little bias, because 
missing information is substituted with “similar” information, however, if inter-item 
correlations within a subindex are low, using the information contained of the other elements 
may result into a considerable bias. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3, Panel B, provides for each country the correlations between subindices, and 
the correlation between each subindex and the CGI. Since each subindex is mechanically 
correlated to the CGI (each subindex is a component of country CGI), we also report the 
correlation between each subindex and the average of the other subindices (index 
complement).  Country CGI is correlated positively with each subindex; with correlation 
coefficients ranging from 0.19 (Ownership Structure in Korea) to 0.93 (Disclosure in 
Turkey).  The correlations of subindices with their complements are generally positive, but 
often much smaller and sometimes insignificant. They range from -0.09 (Ownership 
Structure in Korea) to 0.62 (Board Procedures in Turkey). For Brazil, India and Turkey, inter-
subindex correlations are also mostly positive and statistically significant (India has 2 
negative correlations and Brazil has 1, but without statistical significance).  Korea seems an 
exception because the Ownership Structure subindex correlates negatively with the other 
subindices. 
It is worthwhile taking a more granular look at selected subindices.  In Brazil, RPT 
Subindex correlates quite weakly with the other subindices.  The low correlation is not 
inherently good or bad.  The weak correlation could be a sign of a weak index that does not 
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capture control of RPTs very well.  But it could also indicate that the RPT Subindex is 
capturing an aspect of overall governance that is not well captured by any other subindex.  
We return to what we can say about which interpretation is more likely below, in the PCA 
analysis. For Korea, the negative correlation between Ownership Structure subindex and the 
other subindices suggests substitution between subindices: firms with strong scores on 
Ownership Subindex may choose governance structures which provide lower scores on other 
subindices. 
The generally positive, and sometimes large inter-subindex correlations underscore 
the need to control for a broad measure of governance when assessing the predictive power of 
a particular aspect of governance.  Failing to do so will lead to omitted variable bias (from 
omitting the remaining subindices). 
METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS CONSTRUCT VALIDITY 
In this section we present the two methods that we use to assess the internal validity 
of country subindices: Cronbach’s α and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach’s α is a measure of the correlation between elements of a multipart measure 
and ranges from 0 to 1.  It is defined as: 
𝛼 = 𝑛𝑟
1+(𝑛−1)𝑟    (1) 
Here n is the number of governance elements in the index and r is the mean 
correlation among the elements.  A “high” α provides evidence that the elements measure a 
similar underlying concept.  Conversely, a “low” α provides evidence that the elements are 
not capturing a coherent underlying concept.  As Equation (1) makes apparent, Cronbach’s α 
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measures whether the elements of a multipart measure correlate with each other.  It does not 
– and cannot – directly assess how well the elements capture the underlying construct.  Thus, 
a respectable α value can be seen as necessary, but not sufficient, for true construct validity. 
Unfortunately, Cronbach’s α has several important weaknesses.  There is no simple 
measure for what counts as “high enough.”  One problem can be explained by analogy.  
Consider a test for general skill in mathematics.  If the test consists solely of 20 problems in 
single-digit addition, measured α will be high, but this is only because one has, in substance, 
asked the same question 20 times.  One must start instead with a conscious effort to ask 
different questions, covering different aspects of mathematical knowledge.  For governance, 
one must choose elements which are not too similar to each other.  If one succeeds, the inter-
item correlations should generally be positive, but not “too high.” 
For a test designed in this way, to ask different questions, rather than multiple variants 
of the same question, one rule of thumb from psychology is that α values above 0.7 are 
considered strong, and values above 0.6 are respectable (Kline, 2000).  However, much of the 
education and psychology literature on Cronbach α ignores the sense in which high α, driven 
by high inter-item correlation, might be a sign of test weakness, rather than strength.8 
Cronbach’s α has other weaknesses.  First, as n increases, α converges to 1 even if r is 
low.  In effect, one can get a high α from a few, strongly correlated elements, or from a larger 
number of elements, that correlate more weakly with each other.  Second, with dichotomous 
elements, such as the elements of our governance indices, correlations tend to be small, 
yielding lower α values.9 
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With all these weaknesses, one might wonder why one should use this measure.  We 
can offer several incomplete answers.  First, the alternative of ignoring construct validity 
concerns is not appealing.  Second, we do not have a better measure.  Third, we do not use 
Cronbach’s α alone.  Instead we use several different approaches, to understand the apparent 
validity of our governance measures.  In particular, we attend closely to inter-element and 
inter-subindex correlations, and also use PCA analysis. 
Principal Component Analysis 
Our second approach relies on PCA.  In this approach, one creates eigenvectors 
(linear combinations of governance elements) based on the correlation matrix between 
governance elements (or subindices).  These are usually termed “principal components.”  
PCA is related to but distinct from “factor analysis.”  The vector with the largest eigenvalue 
is the first principal component; the vector with the second largest eigenvalue is the second 
component, and so on.  One usually seeks to interpret the components with the largest 
eigenvalues, and ignores components with low eigenvalues.  One rule of thumb is to retain 
components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0.  But this is only a crude rule, because the more 
elements one starts with, the more eigenvectors will have eigenvalues above 1. 
In our setting, where we combine elements into subindices, one can construct 
principal components either as linear combinations of the subindices, or as linear 
combinations of the elements; we use both approaches.  In forming principal components 
from elements, we examine the five components in each country with the highest 
eigenvalues. 
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One typically tries to interpret each component by examining the elements with high 
“loadings” for that component.  A rule of thumb in factor analysis (which has strong 
similarities to PCA) is to focus on elements with loadings greater than 0.4 (Costello and 
Osborne, 2005); we use this rule of thumb here.  To interpret the retained principal 
components, it is common to rotate them.  We use varimax rotation – a common choice, 
which preserves the orthogonality of the components, while maximizing the sum of variances 
of the squared loadings (Joliffe, 2002: 269).  Varimax rotation often results in principal 
components which are easier to interpret than alternative rotations. 
Panel Data Analyses 
Our outcome variable is Tobin’s q, which is the ratio of the market value to the book 
value of a firm’s assets.  Tobin’s q is a common outcome in “governance-to-value” studies.  
It is a measure of the value of minority shares, and does not capture any extra value of the 
control block.  Tobin’s q can be used to measure the value added by corporate governance; 
the idea is that better governance leads investors to ascribe higher value to the same assets.  
Some governance aspects can also redistribute value between controllers and minority 
shareholders, without affecting overall firm value.  Tobin’s q, is itself an often-criticized 
construct; it remains commonly used because there is no good replacement.  In this study, we 
employ it as a reasonable proxy for the value effects of firms’ governance choices. 
To reduce the influence of high-q outliers, we use the natural logarithm of q and also 
exclude outliers (year by year), for which if a studentized residual from regressing ln(Tobin’s 
q) on country the CGI >  |1.96|.  To limit reverse causation, in which changes in Tobin’s q 
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lead to changes in governance, we measure governance in the first part of a year and Tobin’s 
q at year-end. 
We run firm fixed effects (FE) regressions in each country using an unbalanced panel.  
The firm FE model is well-known (e.g., Wooldridge, 2010, § 10.2) We review here selected 
aspects that are relevant for our study; see Black et al., 2014, 2016, for more details.  The 
model is: 
, 0 , 2 , ,ln( )i t i t i t t i i tq g fβ ε= + + × + + +1β ×CGI β x   (2) 
Here CGIi,t is either an overall country governance index or a vector of subindices; xi,t is a 
vector of covariates, which we assume to be exogenous.  The Appendix provides covariate 
definitions and indicates which covariates are available in each country.  The gt are year 
dummies and the fi are firm effects.  Exogeneity requires, among other things that current 
country governance indices do not influence future x’s.  This is unlikely to be strictly true, 
but may be a reasonable approximation, especially with firm effects.  Prior studies find that 
time varying firm characteristics only weakly predict governance.10  Bhargava and Sargan 
(1983) suggest that assuming exogeneity is more reasonable if one uses a random effects or 
fixed effects specification to address unobserved heterogeneity, if the data has a “short” time 
dimension, and a time-persistent variable of interest.  Both fixed effects and random effects 
will be inconsistent if there are omitted time-varying firm covariates that are correlated with 
both governance indices and Tobin’s q. 
Exogeneity also requires that the current outcome variable ln(qi.t) does not influence 
future governance or x’s.  Greiser and Hadlock (2016) provide evidence that this assumption 
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may not be satisfied in many corporate finance studies and discuss how one might test this 
assumption; doing so is beyond the scope of this project.  
Subject to these exogeneity requirements, the firm FE estimator is consistent even if 
the firm effects are correlated with country governance indices and other covariates.  
However, fixed effects estimates rely only on within-firm variation over time, which reduces 
power.  Since governance often changes slowly over time, the loss of power can be 
substantial.  One also cannot use FE to study aspects of governance with little time variation, 
notably ownership structure. 
We address the potential for correlated standard errors by clustering at the firm level, 
which allows for correlation within firms, across time. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Cronbach’s α and Mean Correlations  
Assessment for Overall Governance Indices.  Table 4 reports information on 
Cronbach’s α and mean inter-item correlations.  Panel A considers the governance elements 
individually (not combined into subindices).  Cronbach α values range from 0.70 in India to 
0.86 in Turkey.  These are reasonably strong values.  However, mean inter-element 
correlations range from 0.05 in India to 0.10 in Turkey.  Thus, the strong α scores are driven 
by a substantial number of elements (ranging from 27 in Korea to 44 in Turkey) rather than 
high inter-element-correlations.  
[Table 4 about here] 
Figure 1 provides a histogram showing the frequency distribution of pairwise 
correlations of governance elements for Brazil (43 elements); the Appendix provides similar 
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histograms for the other countries.  For Brazil correlations are in the range of [-0.62,  0.87], 
but only a few have absolute values exceeding 0.5 and most are between -0.25 and +0.25. 
The mean (median) absolute value is 0.13 (0.08).  The mean and median pairwise 
correlations for India and Korea are similar.11  The Turkey correlations are larger; the mean 
(median) absolute values is 0.22 (0.13), and around 16% of the correlations exceed 0.5.12  
Most pairwise correlations are relatively small because most governance elements are binary 
and because, in choosing elements, we excluded potential elements that were too similar to 
each other. The generally low correlations, combined with relatively strong Cronbach α 
values, suggest that, as we intended in building the indices, the elements capture different 
aspects of corporate governance. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
We also investigate Cronbach’s α and inter-item correlation for the overall 
governance indices, treating them as composed of subindices, rather than individual elements 
(Table 4, Panel B). Since subindices seek to capture different aspects of governance, one 
would hope for intermediate correlations.  Conversely, high inter-index correlations might 
suggest that some subindices are measuring similar underlying constructs, and should perhaps 
be combined.  Cronbach α values are smaller than in Panel A, even though the mean 
correlation is larger, due to the small number of subindices.  Brazil, Korea, and Turkey have 
respectable α values, ranging from 0.50 to 0.58.  India, however, is a noticeable laggard: 0.31.  
Most but not all inter-subindex correlations are positive, the mean absolute value ranges from 
0.18 to 0.22 for Brazil, Korea, and Turkey, but is only 0.08 in India. 
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The Cronbach α exercise can inform one’s assessment of the construct validity of the 
overall governance indices.  For Brazil, Korea, and Turkey, our judgment is that the overall 
indices appear to be reasonable constructs.  In contrast, for India, the lower subindex-based α 
score and low inter-subindex correlations provide a warning that construct validity is likely 
low for the India Corporate Governance Index, and should prompt investigation of why this 
might be and what, if anything, researchers might do about this. 
Assessment for Subindices.  In Panels C-H of Table 4, we focus on the construct 
validity of the subindices.  If the subindices are well-designed, we hope to find intermediate α 
values for elements within a single subindex.  High α values suggest that elements are too 
similar to each other; low values suggest that they are not capturing a similar underlying 
concept. In fact, Cronbach’s α values are smaller than for the overall indices.  This is 
expected due to the smaller number of elements in each subindex.  However, most α values 
are reasonably high.  They range from 0.11 for India Shareholder Rights to 0.86 for Turkey 
Disclosure; 5 of the 19 subindex α values are above 0.7; and 10 values are above 0.6.  Only 
India Shareholder Rights Subindex has α below 0.3.  Some of the lower observed α’s result 
from a small number of measurable elements, either because data is not available, or because 
regulation that limits firms’ governance choices.   
Most subindices also have reasonable mean inter-element correlations, ranging from 
0.03 for India Shareholder Rights to 0.36 for India RPTs. The correlations are between 0.30 
and 0.36 for 3 of the pairwise comparisons; between 0.20 and 0.29 for 6 more; between 0.10 
and 0.19 for 6 pairs; and 0.09 for the remaining 4 pairs (3 of these pairs are from India).  
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This evidence suggests that most subindices, for most countries, are reasonable 
constructs.  At the same time, this analysis suggests caution in relying on at least some 
subindices as good measures of underlying governance aspects.  For example, the low 
Cronbach’s α value for India Shareholder Rights suggests that this subindex is a poor 
construct.  At the other extreme, Turkey Disclosure has a high Cronbach’s α of 0.86.  This 
high α is driven mostly by a large number of elements (23), rather than a large inter-element 
correlation (0.21); this combination suggests that this subindex provides a good measure of 
overall firm disclosure choices. 
Lessons from Cronbach’s α Analysis.  The main lessons from our analysis of 
Cronbach’s α and mean inter-item correlations include: 
(i) Our procedure for building indices and subindices yield reasonable constructs 
in most cases, but construct validity can be less satisfactory for specific 
countries and subindices (for us, mostly in India). 
(ii) In assessing construct validity, one should consider both Cronbach’s α and 
inter-item correlations, with the ideal being to obtain intermediate inter-
element correlations (high values suggest failure to choose distinct elements or 
subindices; while low values suggest that the items may not capture a coherent 
underlying construct. 
(iii) Since correlations among elements of subindices are relatively low, subindices 
with only a few elements increase the risk that one is not measuring well the 
intended general governance aspect. 
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(iv) The low correlations between subindices suggest that to measure overall 
governance, one needs a broad index; conversely, an index for a particular 
aspect, such as board independence, is a poor measure of overall governance. 
Principal Component Analysis 
In Table 5, we present results for subindices for all four countries (Panel A), and 
element-level results for Brazil (Panel B).  Appendix Table 5 presents element-level results 
for the other countries.   
Consider first the subindex results in Panel A.  We report only principal components 
with eigenvalues above 1.0 (“retained components”).  There are two retained components for 
Brazil, India, and Turkey, and one retained component for Korea.  The second column in 
Panel A reports the eigenvalues; the third reports the fraction of total variance explained by 
the component; remaining columns show the loading of each subindex for the retained 
components.  For Brazil, Component 1 loads heavily on Disclosure, but also substantially on 
all other subindices except RPTs. Component 2 loads mainly on Ownership Structure. RPTs 
does not load on either component, suggesting that it is not important in explaining variation 
in governance across firms.  For India, Component 1 loads on Board Structure, Board 
Procedure and RPTs, while Component 2 loads on Board Procedure, Disclosure and 
Shareholder Rights.  For Korea, there is only one retained component, which loads broadly 
on Board Structure, Board Procedure, Disclosure and Shareholder Rights.  For Turkey, 
Component 1 loads broadly on Board Structure, Board Procedure, Disclosure and 
Shareholder Rights; Component 2 loads on Ownership Structure. 
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Thus, for all four countries, the first retained component loads (has loadings > 0.4) on 
either three or four subindices.  This suggests that the subindices collectively capture a 
coherent underlying concept.13  Only RPTs in Brazil and Ownership Structure in Korea do 
not load on any retained component. Thus, PCA analysis points in the same direction as 
Cronbach’s α: to capture overall corporate governance one needs to consider a broad set of 
general aspects of governance. Furthermore, the portion of the variance explained by the 
retained factors is never above 62%, suggesting that the retained components do not capture 
the full richness embedded in the subindices. 
[Table 5 about here] 
In Panel B, we focus on Brazil.  We report only the 5 components with the highest 
eigenvalues, which we term the “main” components.  The first principal component for 
Brazil loads on nine elements, of which eight are within Disclosure Subindex.  This suggests 
that there is coherence to the Disclosure Subindex – its elements tend to load together.  The 
second principal component loads on four elements, all within Shareholder Rights Subindex; 
the third principal component loads on four elements of RPT Subindex; the fourth component 
on three elements of Board Structure, and the fifth component on three elements of 
Ownership Structure.  This pattern suggests that there is coherence to the subindices.  In 
contrast, if the strongest principal components loaded on elements of multiple subindices, this 
would suggest that the subindices are poorly designed, and do not capture coherent aspects of 
governance.  The 5 main components together load on all five Brazil subindices, supporting 
the need for a broad overall governance index. 
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Each of the five main components loads on at least 3 elements, suggesting that 
individual elements do not capture much of the total variance in governance.  These five 
components explain 41% of variance.  The remaining 8 components with eigenvalues > 1 
explain another 29% of variance, which leaves 30% unexplained.  This provides evidence 
that one needs a broad index to capture firm-level variation.   
Lessons from the Principal Component Analysis.  Our main conclusions from the 
PCA analysis are: 
(i) Most of the main components load on elements of one or two subindices 
rather than having loadings that are scattered across three or more subindices 
(Korea, with results reported in the Appendix, is an exception).  This suggests 
that the subindices are measuring distinct, consistent constructs. 
(ii) Components of several different subindices load for one or more of the main 
components, suggesting that a narrow index will not capture overall 
governance well. 
(iii) The elements of some subindices (Board Structure and Shareholder Rights in 
India, and Board Procedures and Ownership Structure in Turkey) do not load 
in any of the main components.  This creates doubt whether these subindices 
capture any relevant underlying concept. 
(iv) Most main components do not load on a single element (the exception is two 
components in Turkey, see Appendix).  This reinforces the idea that one 
cannot capture a general aspect of governance with a single element. 
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The PCA results can also suggest the value of breaking a subindex into sub-
subindices.  For example, Board Structure Subindex might be divided into sub-subindices for 
Board Independence and Board Committees; and Disclosure Subindex might be divided into 
sub-subindices for financial and non-financial disclosure.  The PCA analysis can guide the 
not-always-obvious decisions on which element belongs best in which sub-sub-index.  We 
used our exploratory analysis in this way; it led us to modify Turkey Board Structure Index. 
A further lesson from both the Cronbach’s α and PCA analyses involves the design 
stage of a project that uses governance indices, when one is building an index and subindices, 
without yet assessing what outcomes the index may predict.  Warning signs about low 
within-subindex or across subindex correlations provided by a Cronbach’s α analysis, and 
about limited variation and subindex coherence from a PCA analysis, can suggest the need to 
rethink the index.  One can search for additional useful elements, and consider discarding 
suspect elements.   
Governance and Firm Value 
In this section, we report results from firm FE analyses of whether governance 
predicts Tobin’s q.  For each country, we compare results using (i) our subindices, and (ii) the 
main principal components as predictors.  Table 6 reports our regression analysis, omitting 
the coefficients on the covariates, year dummies and the constant term.  Panel A reports the 
analysis using principal components as regressors (for technical reasons, we can use only 
firm-year observations with no missing governance elements).  Panel B uses the same sample 
but switches to subindices as regressors.  Panel C is similar to Panel B but divides Board 
Structure Subindex into Board Independence and Board Committees subsubindices. 
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[Table 6 about here] 
Panel A shows that in every country the first principal component significantly and 
positively predicts firm value (Tobin’s q).  Component 1 loads on Disclosure Subindex in 
Brazil, India, and Turkey, and on Board Structure Subindex in Korea.  Component 2 takes a 
positive coefficient in all four countries but is statistically significant only in Korea; the 
Korea second component loads on Disclosure and Board Procedure subindices.  All other 
main components are statistically insignificant.  
Panel B reports regression results.14  The subindex results are substantially stronger 
than the PCA results for related principal components.  For example, in Turkey, we go from a 
barely significant result for Component 1, which loads on Disclosure [coeff. = 0.032; t = 
2.04] to a stronger result for Disclosure Subindex [coeff. = 0.066; t = 2.79].  In Brazil and 
Korea, we also get sharper results for Disclosure Subindex than for the principal components 
which loads on Disclosure elements.15  In Korea, the results for Board Structure Subindex in 
Panel C are statistically stronger (t = 4.61) than those for Component 1, which loads on board 
structure (t = 3.86).  Thus, while the PCA results in Panel A are useful, and suggest the 
construct validity of the subindices, they are not a good substitute for the subindices in 
predicting Tobin’s q.  The subindices contain value-relevant information that related principal 
components do not.16 
From Panel B, we obtain a consistent result that Disclosure matters and a less 
consistent result that Board Structure might also matter.  The results for Board Structure 
could be mixed due to how we built this subindex – which combines board independence and 
board committee elements.  At this point,  The PCA analysis suggests that these two sets of 
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elements should perhaps be separated.  In Brazil, Component 4 loads on three Board 
Structure elements, all of involving board independence; in Korea, Components 1 and 3 load 
on six Board Structure elements, four of which relate to board independence; and in Turkey, 
Component 2 loads on four Board Structure elements, three of which relate to board 
independence.  This suggests that it might be useful to separately assess board independence 
and board committee elements.  Panel C therefore reports regression results after splitting 
Board Structure Subindex into sub-subindices for Board Independence and Board 
Committees.  This panel provides stronger evidence that board independence predicts higher 
firm value.  Board Independence Sub-subindex takes a positive, statistically significant 
coefficient in Korea and Brazil, and is marginally significant in Turkey.  The exception is 
India, which has high minimum board independence requirements.  Our Board Independence 
sub-subindex can capture only variation above those minimums, which might be unimportant 
to firm value.  In contrast, Board Committees sub-subindex is positive and significant only 
for Korea, and indeed takes a negative coefficient for Brazil and Turkey. 
CONCLUSION 
Studies of firm-level corporate governance frequently rely on indices which are assumed 
to capture an underlying corporate governance aspect.  However, the construct validity of 
these indices is rarely addressed.  This paper is a first attempt to investigate how the construct 
validity of firm-level governance indices can be assessed, and what one can learn about index 
construction from that effort.  We study the construct validity of firm-level indices in four 
major emerging markets:  Brazil, India, Korea, and Turkey.  We do so at two levels: for 
overall governance indices, comprised of subindices, which are comprised of governance 
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elements, and for subindices, comprised of elements.  We use three principal measures:  
Cronbach’s α; inter-item correlations; and PCA.  The overall indices generally appear to 
provide reasonable construct validity.  The mean correlations across subindices are moderate, 
suggesting that the subindices in fact capture different aspects of governance.  Conversely, 
these correlations suggest that inference from a narrow index, a single subindex, or, even 
worse, a single element, likely suffers from omitted variable bias, because of the omission of 
important aspects of governance. 
At the subindex level construct validity in often reasonable, but we find exceptions, 
where one has less confidence that a subindex is measuring a coherent underlying governance 
aspect.  India Shareholder Rights Subindex is an example.  One can also use the construct 
validity analysis as a guide to how to build indices and subindices.  We rely on that analysis 
to guide an effort to divide Board Structure Subindex into sub-subindices for Board 
Independence and Board Committees. 
We find that regressions of outcome variables (we focus here on Tobin’s q) on principal 
components, while informative, are not a substitute for regressions on carefully built 
subindices.  Instead the subindices often have greater statistical power in predicting Tobin’s 
q. 
Our exploration of construct validity for particular indices leaves a number of areas for 
future research.  One is the application of our approach to construct validity to country-level 
governance indices, rather than the firm-level indices we examine here.  Another involves 
how indices are built.  In this project, we built the indices first, and then sought to assess 
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whether the constructs were sensible.  One could, however, readily imagine embedding the 
assessment of construct validity into index construction.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics for Brazil Sample 
Survey year Public firms 
Responding 
 firms (% of public 
firms) 
Market cap 
 (US$ billions) 
Capitalization of  
responding firms (% 
of public firms) 
2004 261 63 (24%)   524 260 (49%) 
2006 233 92 (39%)   821 495 (60%) 
2009 254 97(38%) 1,191 747 (62%) 
all 3 surveys 254  17   
at least one survey 254  142 (56%) 1,191  854 (72%) 
We present details for Brazil in this Table, and details for India, Korea, and Turkey in the Appendix. 
Brazil sample.  Number of firms and market capitalization for firms which responded to our Brazil surveys. 
Market capitalization is based on exchange rate at Dec. 31, 2009 of R$1.75/US$1 and is measured at end of each 
survey year.  Last row indicates respondents that were public in 2009 and in the dataset at least once.   
TABLE 2 
Board Structure Index Elements in Each Country 
ELEMENTS BRAZIL INDIA KOREA TURKEY 
Board structure index 
Board independence elements 
≥ 1 outside director on board b_bs_1 (NP) NM NM t_bs_1 
> 1 outside director b_bs_2 (NP) NM NM t_bs_2 
≥ 30% outside directors b_bs_3(NP) NM NM t_bs_3 
≥ 50% outside directors b_bs_4 (NP) i_bs_4 k_bs_4 NM 
strictly > 50% outside directors NM i_bs_5 k_bs_5 NM 
CEO is NOT board chairman b_bs_7 i_bs_7 NA t_bs_7 
Board chairman is outside director or firm has 
outside lead director NM NA k_bs_8 NM 
≥ 50% outside directors or ≥ 1/3 outside directors 
and CEO is not chairman17 b_bs_9 (NP) i_bs_9 NA NM 
Audit comm. has outside director NA NA NM t_bs_13 
Audit comm. has majority of outsiders NM i_bs_14 (NP) k_bs_14 NA 
Audit comm. has 2/3 outsiders NM i_bs_15 (NP) k_bs_15 NA 
Permanent fiscal board or audit comm. with 
minority shareholder representative exists b_bs_20 NM NM NM 
Board committee elements 
Audit committee (comm.) exists b_bs_11 NM k_bs_11 NM 
Audit comm. has non-executive chair NA NA NM t_bs_12 
Compensation comm. Exists NM i_bs_16 k_bs_16 NA 
Outside director nominating comm. exists NM NA k_bs_17 NA 
Corporate Governance comm. Exists NM NA NM t_bs_18 
Permanent or near-permanent fiscal board exists b_bs_19 NM NM NM 
Table indicates which governance elements we used in each country. In element label, the first letter indicates 
the country, the next ones the subindex that the element belongs to, and next the number of the element within 
that subindex (e.g., i_dis_11 is element 11 of Disclosure Subindex, for India). Elements in boldface are used as 
index elements.  An element not boldfaced is available and potentially useful, but is not included in the index 
because it is too similar to another element that is used. NP (non-public): not publicly available, NA (not 
available): element is non-public and not collected in our private surveys; NM (not meaningful) because 
mandatory, not allowed, too rare or too common; We use “outside” and “independent” directors interchangeably.  
We present details for Board Structure Index in this Table, and details for the remainder of our governance 
indices in the Appendix.  For additional details on the elements, see the expanded working paper version of 
Black et al. (2014).  
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics and Correlations for Corporate Governance Indices 
Panel A. Summary Statistics For Brazil 
 
Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
Disclosure Index 78.78 90.91 24.65 18.18 100 
Board Structure Index 50.02 57.14 21.67 0 100 
Ownership Structure Index 58.95 57.44 15.95 26.31 91.30 
Board Procedure Index 66.40 66.67 25.03 0 100 
Minority Shareholder Rights Index 46.37 57.14 26.32 0 100 
Related Party Transactions Index 64.42 80.00 30.82 0 100 
Brazil CGI 60.82 63.03 13.63 20.12 90.12 
Sample is pooled across years.  Indices are non-normalized (0~100).  Brazil CGI is average of non-normalized 
indices.  
Panel B.  Correlation coefficients 
   Brazil    
 
DS BS OWN BP SR RPT 
Brazil CGI 0.76*** 0.48*** 0.36*** 0.56*** 0.70*** 0.45*** 
Subindex complement 0.57*** 0.24*** 0.18** 0.29*** 0.47*** 0.08 
Disclosure Index (DS)  0.19*** 0.24** 0.40*** 0.61*** 0.10* 
Board Structure Index (BS)   0.10* 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.05 
Ownership Structure Index (OWN)    0.05 0.29*** 0.04 
Board Procedure Index (BP)     0.15*** -0.01 
Minority Shareholder Rights Index (SR)      0.07 
   India    
India CGI 0.52*** 0.44***  0.55*** 0.36*** 0.64*** 
Subindex complement 0.17*** 0.09**  0.24*** 0.04 0.13*** 
Disclosure Index (DS)  0.039  0.19*** 0.07** 0.09** 
Board Structure Index (BS)    0.07** -0.01 0.09* 
Board Procedure Index (BP)     0.14*** 0.17*** 
Minority Shareholder Rights Index (SR)      -0.04 
   Korea    
Korea CGI 0.75*** 0.63*** 0.19*** 0.67*** 0.74***  
Subindex complement 0.43*** 0.51*** -0.09*** 0.44*** 0.46***  
Disclosure Index (DS)  0.42*** -0.06*** 0.36*** 0.38***  
Board Structure Index (BS)   -0.06*** 0.44*** 0.39***  
Ownership Structure Index (OWN)    -0.12*** -0.04***  
Board Procedure Index (BP)     0.39***  
   Turkey    
Turkey CGI 0.93*** 0.65** 0.19** 0.73** 0.35**  
Subindex complement 0.58*** 0.46** 0.07** 0.62*** 0.24**  
Disclosure Index (DS)  0.37*** 0.05* 0.52*** 0.20***  
Board Structure Index (BS)   0.01 0.43*** 0.15***  
Ownership Structure Index (OWN)    0.04 0.05**  
Board Procedure Index (BP)     0.27***  
Pearson correlation coefficients for non-normalized country CGI, subindices, and “subindex complements” (for 
each subindex, the complement is country CGI – that subindex). *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Significant correlations (at 5% or better) are in bold. 
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TABLE 4 
Cronbach’s α for Country Corporate Governance Indices and Subindices 
  Brazil India Korea Turkey 
A.  All governance elements 
Cronbach α 0.80 0.70 0.76 0.94 
Mean r 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.25 
No. of elements (43) (42) (27) (44) 
B.  All subindices 
Cronbach α 0.56 0.31 0.50 0.58 
Mean r 0.18 0.08 0.20 0.22 
No. of elements (6) (5) (4) (5) 
C.  Board Structure Subindex 
Cronbach α 0.50 0.38 0.74 0.75 
Mean r 0.13 0.09 0.29 0.34 
No. of elements (7) (6) (7) (6) 
D.  Board Procedure Subindex 
Cronbach α 0.58 0.56 0.49 0.61 
Mean r 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.24 
No. of elements (6) (13) (12) (5) 
E.  Disclosure Subindex 
Cronbach α 0.84 0.69 0.43 0.86 
Mean r 0.32 0.15 0.20 0.21 
No. of elements (11) (13) (3) (23) 
F.  Ownership Structure Subindex 
Cronbach α 0.64  ─ 0.40 Mean r 0.26   0.10 
No. of elements (5)  (1) (6) 
G.  Shareholder Rights Subindex 
Cronbach α 0.68 0.11 0.33 0.42 
Mean r 0.23 0.03 0.14 0.15 
No. of elements (7) (4) (3) (4) 
H.  RPTs Subindex 
Cronbach α 0.77 0.77   Mean r 0.32 0.36   
No. of elements (7) (6)   
Table shows Cronbach’s α (top row), mean correlation (r) between elements (middle row) and number of 
elements (in parentheses) for corporate governance elements, indices, and their subindices.  There is no 
Cronbach’s α for the ownership structure subindex in Korea, because the subindex has only one element. 
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TABLE 5 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Panel A. Subindex Components for All Countries 
 Eigenvalue Explained Variance 
Board 
Structure 
Board 
Procedure Disclosure 
Ownership 
Structure 
Shareholder 
Rights RPTs 
Brazil  
Component 1 2.08 34.6% 0.448 0.575 0.860 0.399 0.790 0.173 
Component 2 1.19 19.8% -0.655 -0.435 0.074 0.708 0.224 0.118 
India  
Component 1 1.37 24.7% 0.568 0.439 0.323 -0.284 0.730 1.37 
Component 2 1.08 24.5% -0.122 0.597 0.543 0.748 -0.009 1.08 
Korea  
Component 1 2.24 44.8% 0.767 0.751 0.722 -0.179 0.730 2.24 
Turkey  
Component 1 2.04 40.9% 0.730 0.812 0.802 -0.007 0.445  
Component 2 1.00 20.1% -0.095 0.046 0.029 0.957 0.305  
Panel B. Individual Element Components for Brazil 
Variable Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 Component 5 
Eigenvalue 4.53 4.28 3.83 2.61 2.32 
Explained Variance 10.5% 9.9% 8.9% 6.0% 5.4% 
Board Structure (7) 
b_bs_1 -0.007 0.074 0.025 0.949 -0.015 
b_bs_3 -0.007 0.074 0.025 0.949 -0.015 
b_bs_4 -0.016 -0.121 -0.152 0.683 0.080 
Board Procedures (6) 
b_bp_13 0.460 0.022 -0.072 -0.054 -0.037 
Disclosure (11) 
b_dis_2 0.689 0.313 0.036 -0.098 0.020 
b_dis_3 0.815 0.129 -0.035 0.022 0.127 
b_dis_4 0.417 0.236 0.032 0.062 -0.151 
b_dis_5 0.836 0.229 0.042 -0.001 0.081 
b_dis_7 0.627 0.492 -0.008 -0.050 0.120 
b_dis_8 0.709 0.303 -0.012 0.039 -0.013 
b_dis_9 0.467 0.611 0.019 -0.002 0.138 
b_dis_17 0.567 0.597 0.001 -0.030 0.019 
Ownership Structure (5) 
b_own_2 0.065 0.432 -0.116 -0.038 0.439 
b_own_3 0.074 0.208 -0.052 -0.088 0.649 
b_own_5 0.081 0.197 -0.086 -0.005 0.768 
Shareholder Rights (7) 
b_sr_12 0.280 0.779 0.043 0.067 0.213 
b_sr_13 0.195 0.753 0.063 0.146 0.190 
b_sr_14 0.277 0.797 -0.032 -0.001 0.282 
b_sr_16 0.101 0.650 -0.047 0.108 -0.057 
RPT (7) 
b_rpt_1 -0.006 -0.021 0.980 0.005 -0.027 
b_rpt_2 -0.006 -0.021 0.980 0.005 -0.027 
b_rpt_3 -0.006 -0.021 0.980 0.005 -0.027 
b_rpt_8 -0.131 0.060 0.624 0.013 0.024 
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Panel A:  Loadings of each subindex for the two components retained in PCA for all four countries.  Panel B: the loadings of each 
governance element for the five components of Brazil CGI with the highest eigenvalues.  We report only the elements with loading 
above 0.4 in at least one of the five main components.  Both panels:  We use varimax rotation.  Loadings above 0.4 are in boldface.  
Elements are described in Table 2 and the corresponding Appendix table.   
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TABLE 6 
Governance Components, Subindices and Firm Value across Countries 
Panel A: Uses Principal Components 
 
Brazil India Korea Turkey 
 Coeff. Main loading Coeff. 
Main 
loading Coeff. 
Main 
loading Coeff. 
Main 
loading 
Component 1 0.167*** DIS 0.080** DIS 0.040*** BS 0.032** DIS (2.68) (1.98) (3.86) (2.04) 
Component 2 0.035 DIS/SR 0.028 RPT 0.013** DIS/BP 0.026 BS (0.50) (0.75) (1.98) (1.39) 
Component 3 -0.020 RPT 0.030 BP/DIS 0.006 BS 0.018 DIS (-0.67) (0.92) (0.80) (1.10) 
Component 4 0.051 BS -0.008 BP 0.008 DIS/BP 0.010 DIS (1.02) (-0.24) (1.49) (0.54) 
Component 5 -0.085 OWN 0.030 DIS 0.003 diffuse 0.011 SR (-0.96) (0.92) (0.52) (0.42) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 148 411 2,149 998 
# of firms 77 199 539 188 
Within R2 0.655 0.469 0.370 0.184 
 
Panel B: Uses Subindices (all firms) 
 
Brazil India Korea Turkey 
Disclosure 0.191*** 0.090** 0.022*** 0.066*** (3.83) (2.07) (2.82) (2.79) 
Board Structure 0.068* 0.017 0.033*** 0.017 (1.77) (0.43) (4.61) (0.83) 
Board Procedure -0.001 -0.031 0.006 -0.009 (-0.02) (-0.72) (0.90) (-0.45) 
Shareholder Rights -0.027 0.029 -0.002 0.008 (-0.41) (0.81) (-0.14) (0.53) 
Ownership Structure -0.094*  -0.011 0.055* (-1.98)  (-1.11) (1.70) 
RPT -0.031 0.020   (-1.26) (0.68)   
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 158 411 3,098 1,090 
# of firms 81 199 644 193 
Within R2 0.592 0.441 0.384 0.484 
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Panel C: Uses Subsubindices for Board Independence and Board Committees 
 
Brazil India Korea Turkey 
Disclosure 0.172*** 0.090** 0.020*** 0.062** (3.36) (2.04) (2.73) (2.58) 
Board Independence 0.092** 0.012 0.019*** 0.036* (2.61) (0.32) (3.08) (1.89) 
Board Committees -0.008 0.011 0.015** -0.021 (-0.17) (0.35) (2.37) (-1.07) 
Board Procedure -0.007 -0.032 0.004 -0.006 (-0.21) (-0.72) (0.59) (-0.33) 
Shareholder Rights -0.017 0.028 -0.000 0.003 (-0.27) (0.81) (-0.03) (0.19) 
Ownership Structure -0.098**  -0.012 0.056* (-2.00)  (-1.56) (1.75) 
RPT -0.027 0.019   (-1.26) (0.67)   
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 158 411 3,098 1,090 
# of firms 81 199 644 193 
Within R2 0.592 0.441 0.384 0.484 
Panel A.  Firm fixed effects regressions of ln(Tobin’s q) on either five principal components, covariates (listed in Table 
4, coefficients suppressed) and constant term.  Sample includes only firm-years with complete data on all elements.  
Panel B replaces principal components with subindices and uses full sample (for firm-years with missing elements, we 
build subindices using the average of the nonmissing elements of each subindex). Panel C is similar to Panel D, but 
separates Board Structure Subindex into Board Independence and Board Committees subsubindices.  Observations are 
excluded as outliers if a studentized residual from regressing ln(Tobin’s q) on CGI, year-by-year > ±1.96.  t-statistics, 
using firm clusters, are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels.  Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface; marginally significant results (at 10% level) in italics. 
FIGURE 1 
Histogram of Governance Element Correlations:  Brazil 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
38 
 
 
Histogram shows the frequency distribution for the correlations between the 43 elements of Brazil Corporate 
Governance Index (BCGI).  The minimum (maximum) correlation is -0.62 (+0.87).  The mean (median) value of the 
absolute values of the correlations is 0.13 (0.08). 
 
 
 
Notes: 
                                                 
1 For background on construct validity, see Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002).  Strauss & Smith 
(2009) review more recent literature on construct validity. 
2 Linck, Netter and Yang (2008), Beekes, Hong and Owen (2010), and Lei and Song (2012) employ 
some of the methods we use.  However, their principal focus is to reduce the dimensionality of 
their governance data. 
3 These studies include, e.g., Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2006); Klapper and Love 
(2004); Durnev and Kim (2005) and Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007). 
4 A good general reference for Cronbach’s α is Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). 
5 A good general reference for PCA is Jolliffe (2008). 
6 Detailed information on our data sources, samples, and their representativeness can be found in 
Black et al. (2015). The Brazil, India, and Korea surveys are available on request.  
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7 The exceptions are principally in the Ownership Structure Subindex. 
8 Some studies suggest that inter-item correlations should be as high as possible to constitute a good 
index (Horst, 1966: 147).  Others disagree and recommend smaller values.  Briggs and Cheek 
(1986), for example, argue that the optimal balance between bandwidth and homogeneity of an 
index occurs when the mean inter-item correlations are in the range [0.2-0.4].  Clark and Watson 
(1995: 316) recommend inter-item correlations in the range of [0.15-0.20] for broad higher order 
constructs, and higher values, [0.40-0.50], for narrower constructs. 
9  Our discussion of Cronbach’s α assumes that one starts with an index, and then measures α.  One 
can also use the relative α values from different possible indices to choose between them.  That 
effort, too, is fraught with challenges (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). 
10 See Black, Jang and Kim (2006, Korea), Balasubramian, Black and Khanna (2010, India); Ararat, 
Black, and Yurtoglu (2015, Turkey). 
11  The mean (median) absolute value of the pairwise correlations is 0.11 (0.05) for India and 0.11 
(0.09) for Korea. 
12  The higher correlations in Turkey may stem from Turkey’s comply-or-explain corporate 
governance code, adopted in 2006.  Many firms adopt most of the code elements, so these 
elements are strongly correlated. 
13  An analogy may be useful.  Suppose that one seeks to measure mathematical ability, through 
tests of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, calculus, and statistics, for students who have taken all 
five subjects.  If math ability is a coherent concept, we would expect a major retained 
component, often the first component to load broadly on most or all of the subject-specific tests. 
14  The sample is larger than in Panel A because we can compute subindices based on non-missing 
elements, as described above.   
15  In Brazil Disclosure Subindex has coeff. = 0.191; t = 3.83; while Component 1, which loads only 
on Disclosure, has coeff. = 0.168; t = 2.68.  In Korea, Disclosure Subindex has coeff. = 0.022; t 
= 2.82; while Component 2, which loads on Board Procedure and Disclosure, has coeff. = 0.013; 
t = 1.98.   
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16   Appendix Table App-7 presents results for subindices computed using only firm-year 
observations with no missing elements – thus the same sample as in Panel A.  The principal 
differences from Panel B are: in Korea, Disclosure Index loses significance for Korea, while 
Board Procedure takes a positive and statistically significant coefficient; in Brazil, the coefficient 
on Board Structure Index strengthens and is statistically significant (versus marginally 
significant in Panel B). 
17 This element is required by India’s “Clause 49”; however, not all firms comply. 
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